A Marine sergeant is leading a four-vehicle patrol down a main supply route (MSR) in

Iraq when it is attacked with an improvised explosive device (IED). No one is hurt, though a vehicle sustains minor damage. The triggerman is probably still close; lately all IEDs in the area have been initiated via command-wire. The squad leader sets a cordon, ensures an IED 9-Line is sent to the company headquarters, and waits for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to arrive. With only fourteen Marines to secure the area, the squad leader cannot go too far in search of the triggerman. Meanwhile, the company quickly relays the report to the watch officer in the battalion Combat Operations Center (COC). The air officer and S-2 in the battalion COC immediately collaborate to source overhead surveillance while the watch officer ensures EOD is notified. A Marine Shadow Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is currently conducting surveillance in another part of the battalion's area of operations (AO). The intelligence analyst, who is monitoring the Shadow's progress along a pre-assigned target deck via Microsoft Internet Relay
Chat (mIRC) , directs the UAS to the location of the IED attack. The Shadow will be overhead in less than ten minutes. This true scenario could have ended with the triggerman escaping if the Shadow operator was not communicating directly with the squad leader and providing terminal guidance. The intelligence analyst did not understand how to employ some of the Shadow UAS' operational capabilities, specifically its radio retransmission package and IR pointer. To him the UAS was nothing more than a flying camera. A general lack of understanding of many collections assets' capabilities along with other related targeting, sensor, and surveillance systems is a trend. The previous battalion's intelligence section did not even attempt to set up the MDAS and OSRVT systems that ultimately proved key in increasing this battalion's situational awareness dozens of times. The relieving air officer, after researching the equipment, explained to his battalion's intelligence section that the equipment was worth setting up and learning how to use because of its capabilities. (The intelligence section managed the employment of all collections assets, including UAS and manned theater-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.) Still, the intelligence section was resistant because it was unfamiliar with the gear, choosing to rely solely on the Remote Operated Video Enhance Receiver (ROVER) that was already in place. Ultimately, the air officer and his radio operator read the MDAS and OSRVT 2 The highly sensitive directional antenna of the MDAS significantly increases the receive range of the video downlink over that of the omni-directional ROVER antenna. The OSRVT provides Shadow telemetry data (UAS and sensor target location information) not available via the ROVER system. Using the ROVER instead of the OSRVT, the intelligence analysts would constantly ask the Shadow operator via mIRC where the Shadow sensor was looking. Of note, Scan Eagle telemetry data is not available even with the OSRVT, while all advanced targeting pods, theater level UAS, and most manned ISR platforms with full motion video broadcast telemetry data embedded in the video. manuals, set up the systems, and trained the intelligence section on how to use their equipment that was purchased by the Department of Defense for over $300,000.
Once overhead, the Shadow scans the surrounding area and spots a single individual oddly positioned along the bank of a canal about 300 meters north of the IED blast. The MultiDirectional Antenna System (MDAS) and One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) allow for a good full motion video feed of the infrared (IR) sensor onboard the UAS. The intelligence analyst notifies the watch officer of the sighting. The watch officer tells the radio watch to
This example highlights a problem not isolated to just battalion intelligence sections in Iraq, but one that continues to be voiced by units returning from Afghanistan.
3 A general lack of familiarity with the capabilities, limitations, and concepts of employment of many of the targeting, sensor, and surveillance systems recently fielded is primarily due to the rapid influx of new systems, the methods in which they are fielded, and the lack of training on those systems.
As advances in technology will continue to be used in an attempt to address some of the challenges and troop-to-task limitations brought on by the complexities of counter-insurgency Surveillance System (G-BOSS) with a Class IIIb laser pointer. This class of laser requires users to receive a laser safety class because of the physical damage it can cause. But the training is rarely received due to ignorance of the requirement or logistical constraints once in theater.
Knowledge of the requirement prior to deployment would allow for the training to be accomplished though.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Fielding Methods
The Theater Provided Equipment (TPE), and others. Each fielding method has its particular strengths and weaknesses, some of which are touched upon below.
• Programs of record go through a deliberate process to ensure the gear meets strict criteria and has a long-term fielding, training, and maintenance plan for the life-cycle of the equipment. The initial training is usually conducted during fielding, then eventually transitioned to MOS schools. But this fielding process often takes several years.
• Gear acquired via the UUNS process allows for rapid fielding of new technologies to forward units to meet a critical need. Conversely, it often does not provide for initial training and long-term maintenance, or any sets for pre-deployment training.
• JIEDDO, as a broad DOD initiative, has funded many key force protection initiatives in response to the number of service members killed by IEDs. But often there is a failure to coordinate properly across services while developing solutions.
4
• TPE frequently fills the gaps in the unit table of equipment when it comes to computing, life support, and force protection equipment. But the equipment is often unfamiliar to the receiving unit and is provided without training or clear support and maintenance plans.
The multitude of ways in which new equipment is fielded to the operating forces makes it difficult to track what is coming, when it is coming, and why. Often, a previous unit or higher command element initiated the acquisition process and the background information is neglected in the battlefield handover. Furthermore, subordinate units rarely know to ask higher for newly arrived gear since they had no information on its availability or intended purpose.
Since the beginning of OEF, the Marine Corps has fielded a tremendous amount of new equipment relating to targeting, sensors, and surveillance systems. Responsibility to track all of these changes and inform deploying units about what to expect and how to focus its theater-specific preparations needs to be assigned since a gap clearly remains. For programs of record initial training occurs when the gear is issued to units as well as refresher training built into the contracts. The degree to which that happens and the success of that training is varies. 8 MOS schools are also tasked with providing training. But as new equipment is fielded, the period of instruction cannot be adjusted to fit in that training so the equipment is merely introduced. Furthermore, schools are often the last to receive the gear since the fielding priority goes to operational units and gear fielded through UUNS rarely provides for training sets. 9 The normal channels and methods for pushing information to operational units informational resources are available, and provide an overview of logical concepts of employment and integration based on the predicted threats and environment in which the unit will be operating. With dedicated support and guidance early in the pre-deployment training cycle, units will be better prepared when they step off the plane. Units will then be more likely to employ all of the latest systems to their fullest capabilities, systems which the tax payers have purchased at great expense in order to improve the chance of mission success and save lives.
